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Introduction
In Stanford v. Roche, the Supreme Court took a very textualist approach
and refused to read the text of the Bayh-Dole Act as guaranteeing ownership of
federally funded inventions for contractors of the federal government through an
automatic transfer from the contractors' employees.' This interpretation effectively
eliminated the federal government's rights under the Act in federally funded inven-
tions if its contractors failed to secure ownership of invention from their employees
because these rights are provided through the contractors' ownership of such inven-
tions.2 The Bayh-Dole Act aims to implement a uniform policy in the ownership of
federally funded inventions and sets out important objectives reflecting specific
public interests unique to such inventions.3 These objectives are achieved through
the government's rights in federally funded inventions to promote commercializa-
tion and collaboration between industries and academia.4 Accordingly, the Stan-
ford dissent argued that the majority's interpretation was inconsistent with the Act's
basic purpose.5
Due to lack of resources at technology transfer offices and the complexity of
ownership issues involved in academic-industry collaboration at universities, it is
not easy for universities to secure the ownership of all inventions made by their
1Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2197 (2011).
2 Id. at 2201 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2200-01.
4 Id. at 2201.
5id.
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employees. 6 This is even more true with respect to inventions made by visiting re-
searchers and student interns who are working under informal relationships with
universities that do not fall into the traditional notion of employment. Stanford
highlights the complexity of ownership issues in inventions resulting from a high-
tech environment where researchers and innovations inter-flow beyond the bounda-
ries of firms.
Many legal and economic scholars cite Silicon Valley's information sharing
environment as the key to its success.9 Interaction of researchers from multiple-
firms and the high mobility of such researchers enhance information diffusion and
inter-firm relations among firms in a region.o Researcher interaction improves in-
dustrial outputs, as well as economic growth in the high-tech district." Despite the
numerous benefits praised by economists, such an information sharing culture pre-
sents a serious challenge for university technology transfer offices managing intel-
lectual property, particularly controlling the ownership of inventions and procuring
patents based on the ownership.12 The Stanford majority's interpretation of the
Bayh-Dole Act substantially increases administration costs at universities associat-
ed with promoting practices to secure pre-invention assignments from anyone in-
volved in federally funded research activities. Moreover, universities face due dili-
gence challenges because they cannot prevent their researchers from executing
inconsistent assignment contracts when different aspects of research projects are
conducted in different institutions in the private and academic sectors.' 3
Contrary to steady changes in the working environment, the U.S. Patent Act
remains relatively unchanged with respect to provisions controlling ownership and
inventorship (which is the starting point for determining ownership).14 The statute
has a chapter dedicated to the ownership and assignment; however, that chapter in-
6 See Margo E.D. Reder, Board of Trustees v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc.: Negotiating the Web of
Competing Ownership Claims to Inventions Arising from Government-Funded Academic-Industry
Collaboration, 44 BUSINESS LAW REVIEw 1, 10-13 (2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-1701706e (detailing complications faced by parties involved with
government funded research).
7 Id. at 17.
8 Id.
9 See, e.g., Yuval Feldman, Experimental Approach to the Study ofNormative Failures: Divulging of
Trade Secrets by Silicon Valley Employees, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 105, 105 (2003).
10 WALTER W. POWELL, TRUST-BASED FoRMS OF GOVERNANCE, IN TRUST ORGANIZATION: FRONTIERS
OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 51 (Roderick M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996).
" See Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics ofRights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
683, 718 (1980) (explaining how a social loss occurs when firms refuse to share information).
12 Reder, supra note 6, at 1-2.
' Id. at 16.
14 Univ. Patents Inc. v. Kligman, 762 F. Supp. 1212, 1218 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
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cludes only two sections." Although the overwhelming majority of inventions are
made by employee-inventors through their pre-invention assignment duty under an
employment contract," the U.S. Patent Act is silent on the ownership of inventions
resulting from employment, except for invention ownership resulting from federal-
ly funded research under the Bayh-Dole Act.17
In contrast, patent statutes in major foreign patent jurisdictions include provi-
sions for controlling the ownership of employee inventions.18 In Germany, a sepa-
rate law, the Employee Invention Act (EIA), was enacted to provide detailed rules
for balancing interests of employee-inventors and their employers; in other words,
to balance competing policies under the patent law and labor and employment
law.' 9 The EIA incorporates a mechanism for employers to secure the ownership of
inventions made by their employees; that mechanism protects employers' interests
by giving employers the priority right for claiming to secure the ownership of in-
ventions made by their employee-inventors20 while protecting employee-inventors'
interests through rights of reasonable compensation when the inventors transfer the
ownership to their employers.2 ' Many other jurisdictions have adopted a similar
mechanism from the EIA.22 The U.S. Congress also once made an attempt to adopt
a similar mechanism by introducing a series of bills based on the German EIA.
This article argues that the current Bayh-Dole Act is incomplete because the
Act fails to provide a mechanism for contractors to secure the ownership of federal-
ly funded inventions from their employees. Part I of this Article discusses this flaw
in the current Bayh-Dole Act, highlighted by Stanford v. Roche, and argues that a
historical accident resulted in this flaw due to Congress's failure to pass a series of
bills based on the German EIA. Passages in the Bayh-Dole Act suggest that the
15 U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 261-262 (2006).
16 See Scott Shane, Patents Granted to Small Entities in Decline, SMALL BUSINESS TRENDS (July 19,
2010, 11:39 AM) http://smallbiztrends.com/2010/07/how-smart-is-the-average-entrepreneur.htm
(referring to USPTO statistics, patents issued to small entities recently declined to less than 20%, with
"small" entities including both independent inventors and small firms).
17 Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 202-12 (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010)).
18 See, e.g., Tokkyoho [Patent Act], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 35 [Japan]; CODE DE LA PROPRItTt
INTELLECTUELLES [C.P.I.] art. L611-7(Fr) (providing statutory guidance for employee invention in
Japan and France).
19 Arbeitnehmererfindungesetz, [ArbEG] [Employees' Inventions Act] [hereinafter German EIA].
English translation available at www.wipo.int/clea/docs new/pdflen/de/de039en.pdf, See MICHAEL
TRoIMoRN, EMPLOYEES' INVENTIONS IN GERMANY: A HANDBOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESSES
(2009); HELMUT REITZLE, ET AL, ACT ON EMPLOYEES' INVENTIONS (3d ed., 2007) (providing insight to
the German EIA in English).
20 German EIA, supra note 19, § 6.
21Id. § 9.
22 See CODE DE LA PROPRI Tt INTELLECTUELLES [C.P.I.] art. L611-7(Fr) (providing language similar to
the German EIA).
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Act assumes a transfer by operation of law to secure the ownership of federally
funded inventions through a mechanism provided by the German EIA based bills.
Without such a mechanism, many federal funded inventions will fall outside of the
Bayh-Dole Act if contractors fail to execute written assignments with inventors.
Common law ownership rules do not provide any help to contractors because they
can guarantee only non-transferable, royalty-free, nonexclusive licenses for the
contractors. Many of the contractors, particularly universities, do not practice pa-
tents by themselves. Differing state laws and state legislative actions prevent as-
signment contracts between the contractors and their employee-inventors from se-
curing the ownership of all federally funded inventions, thereby preventing the fed-
federal government from implementing a uniform policy.
In order to propose a mechanism for contractors to secure the ownership of
federally funded inventions, Part II of this article examines a statutory model
based on federal laws for handling inventions closely related to national security.
These Acts provide an effective mechanism for securing rights in the ownership of
inventions by operation of law. However, the increased administrative costs on
both the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") and applicants
would not justify adopting a similar mechanism for the Bayh-Dole Act.
Part III of this article examines the German EIA and compares it with the
Bayh-Dole Act. Congress's interest in the EIA resulted in the overall structure of
Bayh-Dole Act sharing key features with the EIA and thus it should be easy for the
Bayh-Dole Act to adopt an ownership transfer mechanism developed under the EIA.
The comparison also reveals the lack of a mechanism in the current Bayh-Dole Act
for protecting inventors' rights to compensation when ownership is transferred to
employers, although the Bayh-Dole Act does provide inventors a similar right to
compensation.
Part IV of this article discusses which aspects of the German EIA should be
adopted in the Bayh-Dole Act and how that adoption should take place. It will also
propose adopting, from the EIA, a mechanism to protect inventors' rights to com-
pensation. Moreover, today's university research environment makes it necessary
for the federal government to apply the Bayh-Dole restrictions and conditions to
federally funded inventions created by students and visiting researchers, regardless
of employment status with the contractors. With just compensation through royalty
sharing, the Bayh-Dole Act should be revised to allow contractors to secure the
ownership of inventions from these nontraditional employees as long as their inven-
tions resulted from federally funded research activities.
2852012]
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I. Lack of Ownership Transfer Mechanism: Significant Flaw in the Bayh-
Dole Act
1. Stanford v. Roche
The invention at issue in Stanford was a technology based on the polymerase
chain reaction (PRC) technique for detecting and quantifying HIV-the virus that
causes AIDS-in human blood samples (HIV measurement technology). 23 A Stan-
ford researcher, Dr. Holodniy, completed this invention with other Stanford re-
searchers. 24 In June 1988, Dr. Holodniy executed a pre-invention assignment con-
tract which included the term "I agree to assign or confirm in writing to Stanford
and/or Sponsors" with respect to his future inventions. 25 Because he had no prior
experience with the PRC technique, he was instructed by his boss to visit a private
biotech firm, Cetus, and learn the technique. 2 6 In February 1989, Dr. Holodniy ex-
ecuted another pre-invention assignment agreement with Cetus when he began his
27
regular visits to Cetus. The contract with Cetus included the term "I will assign
and do hereby assign to Cetus" with respect to his future inventions.28
After receiving enough training at Cetus, Dr. Holodniy returned to Stanford
and completed the HIV measurement technology. 29 Stanford received government
funding for its HIV research through the National Institute of Health.30 On May 14,
1992, Stanford filed a patent application which resulted in three separate patents
covering different aspects of the HIV measurement technology.1 However, Dr.
Holodniy did not execute an assignment of the ownership of his invention in the
1992 patent application until May 4, 1995.32 All three patents included a notation
that the invention was made with the aid of federal funding.
23 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2192 (2011); Nicholas Wade, Scientist at Work/Kary Mullis; After the 'Eureka,' a Nobelist
Drops Out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1998, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1998/09/15/science/scientist-at-work-kary-mullis-after-the-eureka-a-
nobelist-drops-out.html?scp=1&sq=kary%20mullis&st-cse (stating that the polymerase chain reaction
(PCR) was developed by a researcher, Dr. Kary Mullis).
24 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 837 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), affd, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
25 Id at 841 (emphasis in original).
261 Id. at 837.
2 7 Id. at 842.
28 Id. (emphasis in original).
2 Id. at 837.
30 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 838 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), aff'd, 563 U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
31 Id. at 838, 842.
32 Id. at 842.
31 d. at 838.
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Meanwhile, Roche purchased all PRC related assets from Cetus in December
1991.34 Roche began to sell HIV detection kits, which are widely used in hospitals
and clinics." In April 2000, Stanford and Roche began contesting Roche's owner-
ship through the 1989 Holodniy assignment and negotiating possible licensing con-
ditions; the negotiation led to no agreement.36 On October 14, 2005, Stanford filed
suit against Roche, asserting infringement of the three patents by Roche's HIV de-
tection kits.37 Roche answered and counterclaimed against Stanford, alleging that
Stanford lacked standing to maintain the suit because Roche possessed ownership
of the invention with respect to all three patents.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) agreed
with Roche that it secured the ownership of Holodniy's invention when it acquired
Cetus's PRC assets. 39 The Federal Circuit applied its own case law to the question
of whether contractual language affects a present assignment of patent rights or an
agreement to assign rights in the future inventions, and found the Cetus assignment
contract to constitute the former and the Stanford assignment contract to constitute
the latter. 40 Under its precedents, the terms "I . . . hereby assign" in the Cetus as-
signment contract triggered an automatic transfer of the ownership upon the com-
pletion of invention in contrast to the terms "I agree to assign" in the Stanford as-
signment which needs an additional step to consummate the promise and trigger
transfer of the ownership. Once the invention was completed, the Cetus contract
trumped the Stanford contract, although the Stanford contract originated prior to the
execution of the Cetus contract.4 2 In denying Stanford's ownership, the Federal
Circuit effectively eliminated the federal government's rights in the invention ex-
pressly provided in the Patent Act.
In a seven-to-two vote, the Federal Circuit's conclusion was upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court, rejecting the view that the ownership provisions for federally
funded inventions in the Bayh-Dole Act override state contract laws and common
34 Id. at 837-38.
" Id. at 838.
36 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 838 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), aff'd, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
37 id
" Id.381id.
39 id. at 841-42.
40 id.
41 id.
42 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2202 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
43 The Government has a nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid up license to use the
invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2006). It also has a right to require the patentee to grant a
license to a third party and may have direct control of the invention under certain circumstances. 35
U.S.C. §§ 203, 202(c)(1), 202(c)(2)-(3) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
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law rules controlling invention ownership." Authored by Chief Justice Roberts,
Stanford reemphasized the common law ownership rule under precedent by holding
that the ownership of an invention belongs to the inventor and rejected Stanford's
position that the ownership of federally funded inventions vested in the inventor's
employer-the federal contractor.45 The Supreme Court compared federal laws,
which vest the ownership of inventions to the federal government contrary to the
common law rule, and found no texts in the Bayh-Dole Act supporting the contrac-
tor's ownership.46
The majority also examined the text defining "subject invention" and rejected
Stanford's interpretation that would include all inventions made by the contractor's
employee with the aid of federal funding, contrary to the rule to avoid redundancy
in statutory terms.47 Instead, the majority adopted an interpretation including only
inventions owned by the contractor through a valid and enforceable assignment
contract because this interpretation makes every word in the definition meaningful
and consistent with a dictionary definition of the word.48 This interpretation is fur-
ther supported by the text of other provisions in the Bayh-Dole Act.4 9 The majority
found that the scope of subject inventions under Stanford's interpretation was over-
broad because it included any invention resulting from federally funded research
activities, regardless of the inventor's employment relationship with the contractor
or the amount of federal funds used to support the activities.o
The majority's statutory interpretation followed a traditional, formalistic ap-
proach in trying to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words and phrases that the
parties disputed in context of the structure of the statute and use of the words and
phrases in other provisions. Even though basic policies and objectives were ex-
pressly set out in the Bayh-Dole Act, they played no role in its interpretation. Such
an interpretation based on textualism often leads to results that Congress did not in-
tend.51 For these reasons, the Stanford dissent, authored by the strongly purposivist
Justice Breyer, criticized the majority's interpretation as being inconsistent with the
Bayh-Dole Act's basic purposes and undercutting the Act's ability to implement its
objectives.52
" Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2197.
45 Id at 2198.
46 Id at 2195-96.
47 id.
48 Id. at 2196.
4 9 Id at 2197-98.
5 0 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. ___ 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2198-99 (2011).
5' See id. at 2201 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that the majority's conclusion undermines the
purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act).
52 id
[ VOL. 20:28 1288
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2. Losing an Essential Piece of the Puzzle of the Bayh-Dole Act: Histor-
ical Accident
Although the Stanford majority's statutory interpretation was technically cor-
rect in restraining its role to confirming plain meaning or resolving ambiguity, Jus-
tice Breyer was correct that it led to a result that Congress did not intend or expect,
by letting inventors lawfully assign federally funded inventions and taking them out
of the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act controls. The majority's interpretation also
leads to a conclusion that the common law rule controls the ownership of federally
funded inventions if the federal contractors fail to secure the ownership through an
assignment contract. 3 Moreover, it suggests that state contract laws and special
legislation control the ownership of such inventions even if the contractors diligent-
ly try to secure the ownership through an assignment contract.54 Such a conclusion
subjects the ownership of federally funded inventions to a risk of a technical draft-
ing trap.55 Also, it allows many federally funded inventions out of the Bayh-Dole
Act's restrictions, conditions, and allocation rules and makes it impossible for the
federal government to implement a uniform ownership rule.
Congress did not intend to bring such results. Justice Breyer offered two so-
lutions for avoiding the results: (1) interpreting the contractors' assignment contract
to be consistent to the Bayh-Dole Act's purpose;57 and (2) interpreting the Bayh-
Dole Act as applying the ownership rule under Executive Order 10096,'58 which re-
quires transfer of the ownership of invention by the federally funded employees to
the federally funded employers.5 9 The first solution cannot avoid the result brought
by contractors' failure to execute an assignment contract.6 0 The second solution
can avoid all unintended results, but the executive order provides no basis to apply
its rule to inventors who are not employees of the federal government. 6 1 Further,
the Bayh-Dole Act does not provide a procedure to protect inventors and third-
parties.
5 Id. at 2203.
54 See infra Part 1.4.
55 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2203 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56 Id. at 2201-02 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 2202-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
5 Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2203-04 (Breyer, J., dissenting). See Exec. Order No. 10096
15 Fed. Reg. 389 (Jan. 25, 1950), reprinted as amended in 37 C.F.R. § 501 (2011) (carrying the title
"Providing for a uniform patent policy for the Government with respect to inventions made by Gov-
ernment employees and for the administration of such policy").
5 Id. at 2203 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
6oSee infra, Part I.3.B.
61 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2197 n.4 (2011).
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However, a mechanism for contractors to secure the ownership of all federal-
ly funded inventions from their employee-inventors is an essential part of the Bayh-
Dole Act for implementing a uniform policy. Without the mechanism, many feder-
ally funded inventions would fall out of the Act's governing scope. As the Stanford
majority admitted, reading the definition of "subject invention" to mean all inven-
tions made by the contractor's employees, requiring transfer of the invention own-
ership to the contractor is plausible enough in the abstract.6 2 If Congress intended
contractors to secure ownership by operation of law, why did it fail to include an
ownership transfer mechanism for their contractors? One can find a possible an-
swer in the Act's legislative history: Congress lost a chance to adopt an ownership
transfer mechanism from the German EIA when it failed to pass bills for control-
ling the ownership of inventions under the employment relationship in the private
sector.
Chapter 18 of the U.S. Patent Act was introduced through the enactment of
the Bayh-Dole Act to implement multiple goals through a uniform patent policy for
ownership allocation and licenses with respect to federally funded inventions.
Among the goals, promoting commercialization of federally funded inventions has
been the most successful; it is achieved by giving ownership of the inventions to
universities and encouraging academic-industry collaboration through ownership.6
Interestingly, a review of legislative history reveals that U.S. and German leg-
islators began their efforts leading to the current Bayh-Dole Act and German EIA at
the same historical point: the pre-WWII era. The need for spurring scientific and
technological development for warfare increased government sponsored research
and development in both academic and private sectors and led legislators to adopt
62 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _ , 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2196 (2011).
63 There are numerous publications on the Bayh-Dole Act. See SEAN O'CONNOR, ET AL., LEGAL
CONTEXT OF UNIVERSITY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY (2010), available at
http://sites.nationalacademies.org/PGA/step/PGA_058712 (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) [hereinafter
O'CONNOR, ET AL.]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1669 (1996); Mark A.
Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 614
(2008).
6 Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2201 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Howard Bremer, et al., The
Bayh-Dole Act and Revisionism Redux, 78 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 483 (2009). Congress
recently celebrated the Act's positive impact on the U.S. economy at its 30th anniversary, citing
numerous companies, products, and technologies developed on the basis of federally funded
inventions. H. R. Con. Res. 328, 111th Cong. (2010); House Resolution Honors 30th Anniversary of
the BayhDole Act, NEWSWISE (Nov. 16, 2010, 11:00 AM)
http://www.newswise.com/articles/view/570842/.
65 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 6.
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new patent policies for the ownership of patents resulting from the research and de-
velopment by the end of WWII.6 6
However, the two Acts developed very differently because of different focus-
es and social backgrounds. Acts and regulations, which were the roots of Bayh-
Dole, aimed to balance rights of the federal government against rights of their em-
ployees and contractors; in contrast, regulations leading to the German EIA aimed
at balancing rights of employers against rights of their employees regardless of
their employment in the private or government sector. At the beginning of efforts
to develop a uniform invention ownership allocation policy, the main concern of
Congress was to give the federal government access to federally funded inventions,
because the U.S. Supreme Court had previously developed a common law rule that
employers do not have any rights in the ownership of inventions even if the inven-
tions resulted from the performance of duty under a contract with their employees
and contractors.6 7 To remedy the ownership problem, U.S. employers in the private
sector developed the practice of having their employees execute pre-invention as-
signment contracts. 8 Following the trend of acknowledging freedom of contract,
U.S. Courts upheld and enforced such contracts.69 U.S. employees were unable to
develop a collective power sufficient to enact a law reversing this trend.70 Ac-
knowledging the industry practice, Congress enacted a series of laws to secure the
ownership of national security related inventions.71 To modify the common law
ownership rule, these Acts adopted clear language taking the ownership of federally
funded inventions away from federal employees and contractors and giving it to the
federal government.72 The President also issued an Executive Order for the federal
government to secure ownership of inventions made by federal employees.73
In contrast, German law had already addressed the need to provide govern-
ment access to inventions owned by its employees or private persons through the
operation of a compulsory license provision in the German Patent Act.74 A more
serious need was the removal of a conflict between labor and employment law and
6 Id. at 7.
67 For further discussions see infra Part I.3.B.
68 Jay Dratler Jr., Incentives for People: The Forgotten Purpose of the Patent System, 16 HARV, J. ON
LEGIS. 129, 141-42 (1979).
69 Id.
7 1 Id. at 157.
71 Id. at 150-51.
72 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. , 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2195 (2011).
7 Dratler, supra note 68, at 151-52; Exec. Order No. 10096 15 Fed. Reg. 389 (Jan. 25, 1950),
reprinted as amended in 37 C.F.R. § 501 (2011).
74 German Patent Law § 13.
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the patent law.75 German employee-inventors were able to develop a significant
collective bargaining power well before the pre-WWII era and pressed German leg-
islators to enact a law confirming their rights. The German EIA was enacted to
address this need as well as the need to enhance the Nazi policy of advancing tech-
nology to develop high-tech weapons, including atomic bombs.n
Despite these different focuses, the Bayh-Dole Act and the German EIA share
key features for transferring the ownership of invention. Since preceding acts and
regulations developed in similar time frames, it is very likely that the German EIA
strongly influenced the ownership allocation rules and transfer mechanism between
contractors and the federal government under the Bayh-Dole Act.79 Moreover, this
influence is evidenced by Congress's attempts to pass a series of bills based on the
German EIA. 80 In the 1970s, Congress introduced a series of bills to implement a
federal policy for controlling the employee invention ownership in the private sec-
tor.8' These German EIA based employee invention bills could have introduced a
mechanism for contractor-employers to secure the ownership of inventions from
their employees as an operation of law.82 Accordingly, it is likely that the Bayh-
Dole Act intentionally left the ownership rules under the contractor-employee rela-
tionship to the German EIA based bills. Congress lost an important piece of the
puzzle for developing a system for implementing a uniform federal policy in feder-
ally funded inventions when it failed to pass the bills. As will be discussed below,
some texts in the Bayh-Dole Act support Congress's assumption of incorporating
the missing piece with the German EIA based bills. This historical accident
brought unintended results, as highlighted in Stanford.
7 DIETMAR HARHOFF & KARIN HoIsL, UNIV. OF MUNICH, INSTITUTIONALIZED INCENTIVES FOR
INGENUITY-PATENT VALUE AND THE GERMAN EMPLOYEES' INVENTIONS ACT 8 (2006), available at
epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1 262.
71 Id. at 7.
n7 THE BAYH-DOLE ACT AT 25, 8 n.11 (2006), available at
http://bayhdolecentral.com/BayhDole25_WhitePaper.pdf.
7 See infra, Part III.1 (discussing similarities between German EIA and the Bayh-Dole Act).
79 See id. (postulating that German EIA influenced the Bayh-Dole Act).
so Robert L. Gullette, State Legislation Governing Ownership Rights in Inventions Under Employee
Invention Agreements, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 732, 739 (1980); H.R. 15512, 91st Cong. (1969),
reintroduced as H.R. 1483, 92d Cong. (1971) ("Moss Bills"). A similar bill was introduced again in
1982. H.R. 6635, 97th Cong. (1982).
SH.R. 1483, supra note 80.
82 Id. § 412; William P. Hovell, Patent Ownership: An Employer's Rights to His Employee's Inven-
tion, 58 NOTRE DAME L.REv. 863, 883-86 (1983); O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 29.
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3. Unintended Results: Common Law Ownership Rules
The Stanford majority confirmed that the common law governs the ownership
of federally funded inventions.83 Under this rule, the ownership of an invention be-
longs to the inventor.84 An employer does not have ownership of the invention
made by his employee unless there is an express agreement to transfer the owner-
ship to the employer." Without a mechanism to secure the ownership as an opera-
tion of law, the Bayh-Dole Act pre-supposes an expressive contract between the
contractor and its employees to assign all rights of inventions once the inventions
are complete.
However, limited resources at university technology transfer offices may pre-
vent execution of pre-invention contracts with every employee and researcher who
engages in federally funded research activities because different teams of research-
ers, including visiting researchers and student-interns, engage in different aspects of
research projects in today's academic-industry collaboration.87 If contractors failed
to execute an express assignment contract, federally funded inventions remain with
inventors unless the exception of "specially hired to invent" applies to the employ-
ment relationship between the inventor and employer-contractor. 8 It is unlikely
that the employment relationship between contractors and their employee-inventors
fall into the exception.89 The "shop rights" common law rules provide equity for
employers but have no value to university-contractors because universities do not
practice patents by themselves. 90
A) Fundamental Rule: Inventors as Original Owners
In the United States, only a natural person or natural persons can be the sole
inventor or joint inventors; non-human legal entities, such as corporations, are ex-
cluded from inventorship. 9' It is a fundamental rule that ownership of invention is
8 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2195 (2011).
84 Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. 477, 493 (1850).
85 United States. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
86 Regulations issued by the Administrator of the General Services Administration assumed pre-
invention assignment agreements between the contractors and their employees. Bayh-Dole
implementation Regulations provides a model patent contract. A clause of the contract requires the
contractor to agree to secure the ownership of federally funded inventions that the contractor elects to
retain title for the Federal agency. 37 CFR § 401.14(a), clause (f)(1); Mary LaFrance, LaFrance on
Employee Ownership ofFederally-Funded Inventions, 2010 Emerging Issues 4809 at 6 (2010).
87 Reder, supra note 6, at 16.
8 See infra Part I.3.B.
81 See infra Part I.3.B.
90 See infra Part I.3.B.
91 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.02 (2011) (providing a general discussion of in-
ventorship under U.S. patent law).
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originally vested in the inventor.9 2 Thus, the examination of ownership always
starts from the determination of inventorship.93 Although the ownership issue is
often intertwined with the inventorship issue, it is important to note that the
inventorship issue-who is a true and original inventor-is a separate question
from the ownership issue of who owns property rights in the invention made by the
inventor. 94
Texts in the Bayh-Dole Act are unclear on whether it follows this fundamen-
tal rule and thus made it necessary for the Stanford Court to clarify the meaning of
these phrases in terms of the fundamental rule of invention ownership. The Act
defines subject invention as "any invention of the contractor conceived or first ac-
tually reduced to practice."96 Nothing in the definition touches upon contractor-
employees who conceived or reduced the invention.97 It is unclear whether any
"invention of the contractor" includes all inventions by such employees.9 8 In the
provision for allocating the ownership of subject invention, the Act adopts the
phrase "elect to retain title" to describe the contractor's right.99 This suggests the
ownership as being vested in contractors because contractors cannot retain the
ownership of invention unless they already received it. 00 In another provision, the
term "retention of rights" is used for an employee-inventor to file an application on
its own. 1' This suggests that the Act follows the initial ownership rule exclusive
to the inventor. 102 These phrases seem inconsistent because they suggest entitle-
ment of the ownership for both parties in operation of law.
The rule that the ownership of invention is assignable is another important
rule. 10 3 Although the Patent Act applies to determine inventorship, federal law
92 E.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131
S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011).
9 8 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.02 (2011).
94 id.
9 Stanford, 563 U.S. , 131 S. Ct. at 2196.
96 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006).
9 See Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2200 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[S]ince the
'contractor' (e.g., a university or small business) is unlikely to 'conceiv[e]' of an idea or 'reduc[e]' it
'to practice' other than through its employees, the term 'invention of the contractor' must refer to the
work and ideas of those employees.").
98 Id
99 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
00 Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2190.
'01 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006).
102 Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2198 n.6 (2011) (distinguishing "title" to be retained by
contractors from "rights" to be retained by inventors. "That argument has some force. But there may
be situations where an inventor, by the terms of an assignment, has subsidiary rights in an invention to
which a contractor has title, as §202(d) suggests.").
'03 Id. at 2196.
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plays a very small role in the determination of ownership before filing a patent ap-
plication with the USPTO when rights in the ownership of invention are transferred
from the original inventor.'1 An inventor may contract to transfer rights in future
inventions before completion of the inventions; nevertheless, rights and obligations
for the transfer under such a contract is controlled by state law.'0o Unlike the Ger-
man EIA, Bayh-Dole has no express provision to limit inventors' abilities to trans-
fer their rights in the ownership of federally funded inventions to a party other than
their employers. 0 6 Such transfer may occur before or after patent filing. 107
Texts in the Bayh-Dole Act may read to conflict with another fundamental
rule: in principle, a patent should be issued only to an applying inventor although it
may be issued to an inventor's assignee because interests in invention are assigna-
ble in law by an instrument in writing.'0o This rule that applications can be assigna-
ble by an instrument in writing is codified in the Patent Act.'09 The statute makes
clear that a patent application must be filed by the inventor, even if rights in the in-
vention are transferred to a third-party."o In contrast, the Bayh-Dole Act requires
contractor-employers, instead of their employee-inventors, to file domestic and for-
eign patent applications."' This conflict with the fundamental rule also makes un-
clear who is the original owner, because the right of the contractor is defined as one
to "elect to retain title to a subject invention" throughout the Act.11
These texts, inconsistent with the fundamental rules, would make sense if
Congress enacted Bayh-Dole with an assumption that contractors would secure
ownership of inventions through the mechanism found in the German EIA based
bills." 3 The phrase "any invention of the contractor" should be read to mean those
for which the employer-contractor secures ownership by exercising the right to
claim the invention while preventing any disposition of federally funded inventions
' Mary LaFrance, Nevada's Employee Inventions Statute: Novel, Nonobvious, and Patently Wrong, 3
NEv L.J. 88, 90-91 (2002).
105 8 CHISuM, supra note 93, § 22.03.
106 See Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2201 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing his opin-
ion that there should be a limitation to prevent inventors from unilaterally terminating their
assignment agreements their employer-contractors through a separate assignment to transfer the
ownership of federally funded invention to a third party).
107 See id at 2202-03 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining how an assignee receives an equitable title
when interests in invention is assigned from the inventor before filing a patent application: the
assigner secures title of the invention when an application is filed by the inventor).
log Id. at 2194-95.
'* 35 U.S.C. §261 (2006).
"o See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2006).
" 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(3) (2006).
112 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
" H.R. 1483, 92d Cong. (1971) (also known as the "Moss Bills").
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to a party prior to the contractor's exercise of the right. 114 When the contractor fails
to exercise the right, the ownership remains with the employee-inventor. Thus, the
term "retain" is used for both contractor and inventor." 5
Further, the contractor's duty of filing a patent application is parallel to the
employer's duty of patent application in the bills." 6 However, the bills made clear
that the application must be filed in the name of the inventor, and thus the text in
the Bayh-Dole Act should also read the same way."' In short, these texts tend to
support Congress's intent to introduce a mechanism for employer-contractors to se-
cure the ownership made by their employees though the German EIA bills.
B) Employers' Rights in Employee Inventions Under U.S. Common
Law
U.S. common law gives employers very limited rights in inventions made by
their employees even if they are hired to invent."' This is particularly true with re-
spect to university researchers because many of them are hired to teach and conduct
basic research. Without any written assignment contract, the majority of inven-
tions fall out of the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act, even if they resulted from federal-
ly funded research activities.
As the Stanford majority noted, it is often true that property rights in fruits of
labor belong to his employer." 9 This rule does not apply to patents because mere
employment is not sufficient to transfer the ownership of employee inventions to
the employer.12 0 In general, the ownership of inventions belongs to inventors and
does not transfer to their employers unless the inventors expressly agree to assign
the inventions.121 As early as 1843, the Supreme Court had assumed that ownership
of employee inventions went to the inventor.122 However, the Supreme Court tried
to account for the interests of employers by giving royalty free, non-exclusive li-
censes known as "shop rights." 23
114 Id. § 412.
Id. § 413.
Id § 421.
117 id.
118 See 8 CHIsuM, supra note 93, § 22.03 (providing a general discussion of employer's rights in
employee inventions under U.S. patent law).
119 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2196 (2011).
120 id.
121 Id. at 2195.
122 8 CmsuM, supra note 93, § 22.03.
123 id.
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Beginning from the first Patent Act in 1790, the U.S. patent system has grant-
ed patents only to applications filed by the first and true inventors.124 The same
first Patent Act presupposes an invention made by multiple joint-inventors. 12 5 The
employer of an inventor, however, cannot be qualified as a co-inventor. Regardless
of financial contributions or instructions given by a natural person-employer, such
employer cannot obtain any rights in the ownership of an invention unless she is a
joint inventor of a technology that resulted from joint labors with her employee-
inventor.12 6 To qualify as a joint-inventor, she must make a contribution to the
conception of the invention.127 This is in stark contrast to the ownership of author-
ship under U.S. Copyright Law, which gives the ownership directly to employers
under the work-for-hire doctrine.' 28
Therefore, universities cannot be co-inventors, and thus, can secure the own-
ership of invention only when they receive the ownership from inventors through
an express assignment agreement. To protect interests of employers who fail to ex-
ecute an express agreement, U.S. courts developed common law rules to give some
rights to such employers: (1) if an employee is specially hired to make the particu-
lar invention or (2) if an employee is hired to make inventions in general.' 29 As
employers, universities should also obtain these rights when their employment with
inventors meets these conditions; however, as will be discussed below, it is unlikely
that the employment relationship between universities and their inventors meets the
second condition. Thus, the common law rule does not help universities secure
ownership of federally funded inventions.
Interestingly, the foundation of the current common law rule of ownership al-
location was developed through the federal government's struggles over the owner-
ship of its employees' inventions. One of the earliest cases disputing the ownership
of an employee invention was United States v. Burns.3 0 In this case, the inventor
was a Major in the United States Army, and his duty had nothing to do with making
inventions.1' He invented a tent during his employment and obtained a patent on
the invention.132 Although the Army initially agreed to pay a royalty for a license
124 Patent Act of 1790, §6. Since patent applications were not examined under 1790 Act, a patentee
needed to produce evidence that he was the first and true inventor to enforce his patent in court.
125 Id. § 1; see also I CHISUM, supra note 91 (providing a general discussion on multi-inventor
patents).
126 1 CHISUM, supra note 91 (citing Steams v. Barret, 22 F.Cas. 1175, 1181 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816)).
127 Stem v. Trs. of Columbia Univ., 434 F.3d 1375, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also 1 CHISUM, supra
note 91, § 2.02[21[a].
128 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010); see also LaFrance, supra note 104, at 100 (comparing
the ownership rules between copyright and patents).
129 1 CHISUM, supra note 91, § 2.03.
130 79 U.S. 246, 251 (1870).
13 1 Id. at 252.
1 32 id.
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to use his patented tent, it later attempted to avoid payment.'3 3 While affirming the
Court of Claims's judgment to order the payment, the Supreme Court commented
in dictum as to the government's rights in the ownership of invention: "[i]f an of-
ficer in the military service, not specially employed to make experiments with a
view to suggest improvements, devises a new and valuable improvement in arms,
tents, or any other kind of war materials, he is entitled to the benefit of it, . . . the
government cannot, after the patent is issued, make use of the improvement any
more than a private individual, without license of the inventor or making compen-
sation to him."1 3 4
In dicta, the Court likewise commented on the applicability of the ownership
rule to private employee-inventors.' 35 This ownership rule, exclusive to inventors,
was further reinforced in Solomons v. United States,' 36 another case involving a
federal government employee in which the Court held that the mere presence of an
employment contract with an inventor does not give rise to any rights in the inven-
tion for his employer. As a result, the ownership rule, exclusive to inventors, took a
firm root as a common law rule in U.S. case law.
Although U.S. courts have consistently denied any rights in the ownership to
non-inventors, based solely on the invention resulting from the performance of an
employment contract, they have been concerned about fairness and equity with re-
spect to interests to employers who provided physical facilities and financial sup-
port for making the invention. 37 Such concerns led to the development of two ex-
ceptions to the ownership exclusive to the inventor rule: (1) non-exclusive,
personal, non-transferable licenses called shop rights and (2) a duty of assignment
based on the contract to hire inventors for inventing particular subject matter.138
The McClurg case, decided in 1843, involved an invention made by an employee of
a private firm.13 9 In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court's finding
that presumed a license with respect to an improvement made by the inventor in the
course of his employment.140
Relying on McClurg, the Court endorsed the presence of an implied license in
another case involving an employee-inventor of a private firm, Hapgood v.
Hewitt.141 However, the Court clearly distinguished the nature of employment giv-
133 Id. at 253.
'
4 1d. at 252.
135 d.
"3 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
137 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[1][d].
.. Id. § 22.03.
139 McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 205 (1843).
'4Id. at 204.
141 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886).
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ing rise to a license from that of employment giving rise to a duty to assign rights in
the ownership of invention.14 2 Although the inventor was hired to invent in general,
such employment gave rise only to a personal and non-transferable license. 143 The
Court denied the plaintiffs claim to transfer the ownership of invention.'4
The concept of an implied license was further elaborated in the context of the
employment law rule in the government employer case discussed above,
Solomons.' 45 The Court made it clear that if an employee was hired to invent some-
thing, he had thereby given his employer an irrevocable license to use his inven-
tion.1 The Court justified the implied license by relying on the fact that the inven-
tor "recognized [his] obligations of service flowing from his employment and the
benefits resulting from his use of property, and the assistance of the co-employees,
of his employer." 4 7 In short, the Supreme Court acknowledged the fundamental
employment rule.
Nevertheless, the Court decided to maintain the supremacy of the ownership-
exclusive-to-the-inventor rule while granting a license to compensate employers for
their loss of rights in the ownership of inventions, a type of property resulting from
their employees' labor.14 8 The Court later called this royalty free non-exclusive li-
cense a shop right stating that "where a servant, during his hours of employment,
working with his master's materials and appliances, conceives and perfects an in-
vention for which he obtains a patent, he must accord his master a nonexclusive
right to practice the invention."l 49 Since employee-inventors receive federal funds
from universities, as well as assistance of co-workers and access to facilities, uni-
versities are clearly entitled to a "shop right" for federally funded inventions made
by their employees; however, such right has no value to universities because uni-
versities do not practice inventions by themselves and a shop right is non-
transferable.'50
In addition to being subject to shop rights, U.S. employees are under a duty to
transfer rights in the ownership of their inventions if the nature of employment in-
dicates that the employees are specially hired to invent a specific machine or pro-
142 d.
143 id
144id
145 Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
146 d
147 d.
148 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2195 (2011).
149 United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.178, 188 (1933).
150 Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886); 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[1][c].
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cess.' 5 ' It is unlikely that the employment relationships between universities and
their employees fall into this category. In Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, the employ-
ment contract between a private employer and its employee expressly indicated that
the inventor was hired to develop a process and the associated machinery for the
production of a part used in a particular product of the employer.15 2 Although the
contract was silent with respect to patents resulting from the development, the
Court affirmed the district court's decree ordering the employee to transfer the
ownership of patents to his employer.s 3 Even if a researcher is hired to conduct a
particular research project identified in a funding agreement, it is unlikely that the
employment contract with the university satisfied the degree of subject matter spec-
ification, with respect to a particular invention, that would give rise to an ownership
assignment duty.
U.S. common law requires employers to give full notice during employment
contract negotiations to their employee-inventors regarding the transfer of invention
ownership subject to the employment contract, because the "specially hired to in-
vent" doctrine is an exception to the ownership rule exclusive to inventors. U.S.
courts have repeatedly held that an employment contract to hire an employee for
inventing something in general does not give rise to a duty of assignment.154 In an-
other case involving a government employee, United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., the Supreme Court emphasized the distinction between the contract of hiring
an inventor for conducting research and making inventions in general, and that of
hiring an inventor for making a particular invention.15 5 According to the majority
in Dubilier, hiring an employee to create an invention gives rise to an ownership
assignment duty with respect to that employee's inventions only if such inventions
are the precise subject of the employment contract.156 Accordingly, the terms of an
employment contract must be clear enough to define which invention the employer
paid for so that the ownership of that invention can be transferred to the employer.
The Court highlighted the distinction between rights in the ownership of inventions
and other types of properties resulting from regular labor; only the former was said
to result from inventive activities showing an exercise of unique creativity beyond
ordinary skill.15 7
Due to this special nature of inventions, rights in the ownership of the inven-
tion do not transfer to employers unless employees specially bargained for and
15' 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[2].
152 264 U.S. 52, 59 (1924).
' Id. at 59-60.
154 8 CIsuM,supra note 93, § 22.03[2]; Aetna-Standard Eng'g Co. v. Rowland, 493 A.2d 1375, 1377
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
s 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
I56 id.
'" Id. at 189-190.
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agreed to the compensation for the inventions when they entered into the employ-
ment contract. It is rare for universities to have an employment contract detailing
tasks for university researchers. Further, university researchers engage in basic re-
search, which usually results in inventions that need further investment prior to
commercialization.' University inventors do not have opportunities to bargain for
such inventions when they are first employed by universities because their inven-
tions are unforeseeable at the initial time of employment." 9
The Court also used this special nature of invention to define the scope of
shop rights.'60 Employers are entitled to a license to use the invention, but have no
right to demand a transfer of the ownership of invention because the invention is
the original conception of the employee; thus, it should remain the property of the
employee. 16 1 In Dubilier Condenser Corp., the employment contract only stipulat-
ed that the inventor was hired to conduct research in general.162 This finding led to
the Court's refusal to transfer patents held by the employee-inventor to the federal
employer. 163 Thus, Dubilier also implies that universities can only obtain a shop
right.
This reluctance to infer a contract to assign rights in the ownership of an in-
vention is supported by the patent policy of promoting innovations through inven-
tions. To preserve incentives to invent, U.S. case law prevents employers from tak-
ing away property rights in the invention and secures opportunities for employee-
inventors to bargain with their employers for the fair value of their inventions.'6" In
other words, the patent policy of promoting innovation through rewards to inven-
tors is supported through the bargaining between inventors and their employers
over a transfer of property rights in inventions.
The Bayh-Dole Act touches upon neither shop rights nor the "specially-hired
doctrine." Under the common law ownership rule, in addition to the contractors,
the government may have a shop right with respect to inventions made by its con-
tractors' employees, depending on the nature of the contract. Some may view the
provision to require an agreement in the contract with respect to the government's
right to use the invention as simply confirming the common law shop rights.
The Bayh-Dole Act's legislative history rejects such a view and instead sup-
ports a view that the right is created only through an express license with the con-
158 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (discussing the
difficulties facing universities arising from their focus on basic research).
1'9 United States. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 188 (1933).
60 id
161 Id. at 188-89.
162 Id. at 193.
16 Id. at 189-90.
16 LaFrance, supra note 104, at 93; 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[2].
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tractor. In an early effort to develop a uniform patent policy concerning federal
employees, the government issued an executive order defining the types of em-
ployment that give rise to the duty to transfer the ownership of invention and to a
"shop right."165 An Attorney General report leading to the executive order also in-
cluded a recommendation for the ownership of federally funded inventions devel-
oped by government contractors.166 It did not recommend using the definitions for
deciding the ownership of contractor inventions; instead, it adopted a general rule
to retain government ownership of such inventions with some exceptions.16 7 The
recommendation required inclusion of a clause granting the government a right to
use the invention and "March-in Rights" in a contract between a federal agency and
its contractor when an exception applies and the government allows the contractor
to retain ownership of federally funded inventions.168 This recommendation was
implemented by the Kennedy Administration in 1963.169 Since the Bayh-Dole Act
codified the government's rights, the rights to use the invention under the Act
should be viewed separately from a shop right under the common law ownership
rule. Thus, these rights should be available only through an express license from
the contractors who hold the ownership of inventions and patents.
Throughout the legislative history of the Bayh-Dole Act, Congress paid very
little attention to contractor-employee relationships during the development of the
best practice of ownership allocation because this exercise focused on the allocation
between the government and its contractors. 170 This relationship was only dis-
cussed with respect to the German EIA based bills.'71 In other words, implementa-
tion of the best ownership allocation relied on the assumption that contractors are
able to secure ownership of all inventions that fall into the definition of "subject in-
vention" through pre-invention assignment contract practice until the bills introduce
an ownership transfer mechanism in operation of law. Unfortunately, this assump-
tion has not always proven true, as illustrated in Stanford. Moreover, Congress has
never been able to pass the contemplated bills. The common law rule is not helpful
for contractors, particularly universities, in securing the ownership of invention if
they fail to execute an assignment contract. If a contractor fails to secure owner-
ship of a federally funded invention, the federal government loses rights in that in-
165 Exec. Order No. 10096, 15 Fed. Reg. 389 (Jan. 25, 1950), reprinted as amended in 37 C.F.R. §
501.6 (2011).
166 1 DEPT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REP. OF THE ATT'Y GEN. TO THE PRESIDENT ON Gov'T PATENT PRACTICES
& POLICIES, SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ATr'Y GEN. 4 (1947).
167 Id. at 5; O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 8.
168 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 8.
169 Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep't and Agencies, 28 Fed. Reg. 10943, 10943 (Oct. 12,
1963); O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 10.
170 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 15.
17' H.R. 1483, 92d Cong. (1971) (known as "Moss Bills").
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vention because government rights in inventions can only be secured through
agreements with its contractors.
4. Unintended Results: Non-Uniform Assignment under State Contract
Law and Special Legislations
Even if contractors execute an express assignment contract with their em-
ployees, it is unclear whether the assignment duty is enforceable if the duty in-
cludes assignments of all inventions which fall into the definition of subject inven-
tions: "conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the performance of work
under a funding agreement."l72 The Stanford majority suggested that such an as-
signment duty is overbroad.173 Moreover, the enforceable scope of such assignment
agreements may differ from one state to another. This non-uniformity in securing
the ownership of federally funded inventions through pre-invention assignment
contracts hinders the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act.
Despite the important role played by pre-invention assignment contracts in
implementing federal policy, U.S. courts leave interpretation and enforceability of
contract terms to the governance of state policies through the application of state
contract law.174 The Supreme Court empowered state courts to develop their own
laws governing state questions regarding such invention issues as ownership and
transfer of patents.175 However, state courts in general acknowledge the signifi-
cance of federal case law and follow the precedent of the Supreme Court.7  This
has led to a development of fairly uniform common law rules in ownership and as-
signment enforceability throughout state and federal courts in the United States.
Although the uniform common law requires an express agreement to transfer
ownership, state law generally governs such an agreement, with some exceptions.177
One such exception arises when there is a question as to whether a patent assign-
ment clause created an automatic assignment. 17 8 This issue is governed by federal
law because it closely relates to the question of standing in patent cases governed
by federal laws." 9 Under Federal Circuit case law, the contract language "agree to
assign" indicates a mere promise to assign; thus, the assignment of future inven-
tions does not occur unless a subsequent written instrument executes the assign-
172 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006).
17 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2198 (2011).
174 8 CHISUM, supra note 93, § 22.03[4].
17 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
176 See, e.g., Farmland Irrigation Co., v. Dopplmaier, 308 P.2d 732, 740 (Cal. 1957).
17 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832,
837 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff'd, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011).
178 DDB Techs., L.L.C. v. MLB Advanced Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
179 Roche, 583 F.3d at 841.
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ment. 80 In contrast, the language "do hereby assign" or "will assign" indicates a
present assignment and rights in the inventions are automatically transferred to the
employer as soon as the inventions are completed. 18 ' Accordingly, whether a con-
tractor secures a transfer of ownership of a federally funded invention depends on
the terms used in the pre-invention assignment contract that the contractor and its
employees agreed upon, leaving contractors to easily fall into a technical drafting
trap.182 Although it is likely that state courts also follow Federal Circuit case law,
they may apply their own law, which may lead to a different conclusion with re-
spect to the ownership of a federally funded invention.
Furthermore, differing state public policies regarding the ownership of an as-
signment agreement in employment contracts lead to non-uniformity in the scope of
inventions for which contractors can secure ownership of federally funded inven-
tions from their employees. In general, employers are not required to pay any addi-
tional compensation as a consideration for a transfer of rights in an invention.183
This is because U.S. courts view the payment of salary, assistance of co-employees,
and right to use an employer's facility as constituting sufficient consideration.184
Legal scholars have criticized the case law endorsing U.S. industry pre-invention
assignment practice without any compensation and some argue that lack of addi-
tional compensation dampens incentive to invent and contradicts the federal patent
system policy under the Copyright and Patent Clause.' 85 These academic views are
not persuasive to U.S. courts, which refuse to find any right that the constitutional
clause gives to inventors. 86 Since the common law ownership rules require pre-
invention assignment agreements to be not only expressive, but also clear (in order
to give a notice to inventors with respect to what they give up in exchange for their
180 id.
' Id. at 842; see also Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563
U.S. -, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2198 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing this interpretation
distinguishing two equitable claims based on the terms in pre-assignment contracts and urging the
application of the previous rule that treated two claims equally and gave the ownership of invention to
Stanford because the Stanford contract came first and then subsequently obtained a post-invention
assignment).
182 Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2203 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
183 Henrik D. Parker, Reform for Rights of Employed Inventors, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 603, 608 (1984);
Ann Bartow, Inventors of the World, Unite! A Call for Collective Action by Employee-Inventors, 37
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 673, 673 (1997).
184 E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Miller, 22 F.2d 353, 355 (9th Cir. 1927).
18 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 183, at 604-05; Bartow, supra note 183, at 683-84; Mark B. Baker &
Andre J. Brunel, Restructuring the Judicial Evaluation of Employed Inventors' Rights, 35 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 399 (1991); Steven Cherensky, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, Pre-Invention
Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. REv. 597 (1993).
18 Teleflex Info. Sys. Inc. v. Arnold, 513 S.E.2d 85, 87 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999).
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salary) courts consider the inventor's salary as sufficient consideration to enforce
the agreement.1 7
Although U.S. courts favor enforcing an express assignment contract, if an
employee's duties of assignment are overbroad, they may decline to enforce an
agreement literally.188 Courts may reinterpret the overbroad agreement to limit the
duties within a reasonable scope.189 In some states, an employment contract includ-
ing an overbroad assignment agreement is void and unenforceable.' 90 In general,
legislation enacted in these states prevents employers from enforcing a contract ob-
ligating a transfer of rights in the ownership of the invention that is developed en-
tirely on the employee's own time unless (1) the invention relates to employer's
business or to the employer's actual or "demonstrably anticipated" research and de-
velopment or (2) the invention results from work performed by the employee for
the employer.'9 ' In contrast, only one state, Nevada, has enacted legislation which
allows transfer of rights in the ownership of invention automatically without any
express agreement if the invention is made during the term of employment and falls
within the scope of the employee's job description.192 In some states, a contract to
transfer rights in the ownership of any invention made during the term of employ-
ment may be valid and enforceable regardless of the invention's relation to the in-
ventor's duties or the employer's business, as long as the invention resulted from
work the employee conducted for his employer. 93
In short, the ownership of an invention may or may not transfer to contractors
depending on the state law which governs the employment relationship. There is
no uniform federal law to govern the enforceable scope of an employee invention
assignment agreement. When Congress failed to pass the German EIA based bills,
it also lost a chance to develop a uniform policy to govern assignment contracts for
employee inventions, including federally funded inventions.19 4 Furthermore, the
Stanford majority's comment on the scope of subject invention suggests its interest
in overriding state contract laws and special legislations while preventing the en-
forcement of overbroad assignment duties.195 This leads to another uncertainty:
187 Aetna-Standard Eng'g Corp. v. Rowland, 493 A.2d 1375, 1379 (Pa. 1985).
18 Dratler, supra note 68, at 142.
189 Id. at 142-44 (dicussing Guth v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 72 F.2d 385, 387-88 (7th Cir. 1934));
see also Universal Winding Co. v. Clarke, 108 F. Supp. 329 (D. Conn. 1952).
190 These states currently include California, Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington and Nevada.
O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 85.
191 LaFrance, supra note 104, at 96.
'
92 d. at88
193 Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 229 Cal Rptr. 828, 836 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
194 H.R. 1483, 92d Cong. (1971).
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whether the ownership of a federally funded invention may or may not transfer to
contractors.
Finally, the Stanford majority's interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act does not
prevent employee-inventors from transferring the ownership of federally funded in-
ventions to a party other than their employer-contractors. 196  Stanford could not
have avoided its loss of ownership even if it had executed an automatic assignment
with the inventor because the inventor already executed an assignment contract
with a third-party prior to the Stanford assignment. In academic-industry collabo-
rations, researchers move back and forth between universities and industry partners
and conduct different aspects of research projects in various locations with different
research teams.'9 Researchers contract for multiple assignments with a variety of
terms throughout projects, which often leads to inconsistent duties, as highlighted
in Stanford. With limited resources, it is impossible for contractors to conduct due
diligence on all researchers with respect to their prior assignments.
II. Ownership Transfer Mechanism Under Federal Laws for Handling
National Security Related Inventions
Since a uniform policy could be implemented through contractors' ownership
of federally funded inventions, the Bayh-Dole Act should adopt a mechanism for
transferring such ownership to contractors. Congress has already incorporated such
a mechanism in federal laws for handling inventions closely related to national se-
curity. 19 8 Statutes and regulations dealing with such inventions provide mecha-
nisms for securing the government's ownership through an automatic transfer by
operation of law.1 99 They also provide procedures for inventors and their assignees
to challenge the federal government's ownership and protect their interests.20 0
Stanford urged the Supreme Court to read the Bayh-Dole Act to implicitly adopt a
similar mechanism. 201  The Court rejected Stanford's interpretation because the
Act does not include language that clearly negates the common law ownership rules
and lacks procedures to protect inventors and third-parties who did not receive fed-
eral funds.2 02 This suggests that the Bayh-Dole Act could be revised to adopt the
195 See Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _, 131
S. Ct. 2188, 2198 (2011) ("Stanford's reading suggests that the school would obtain title to one of its
employee's inventions even if only one dollar of federal funding was applied toward the invention's
conception or reduction to practice.").
'
9 Id. at 2201.
197 Reder, supra note 6, at 16.
198 See infra Part 11.1-2.
'
9 9 See infra Part II.1-2.
200 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _ 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2191 (2011).
2011 Id. at 2195-96.
2021d. at 2196-98.
306 [ VOL. 20:28 1
Serious Flaw of Employee Invention Ownership
mechanism from these federal laws by including language that vests the ownership
in contractors and adopts a procedure to protect third-parties; however, such a revi-
sion may not be feasible because it would substantially increase the administration
costs of both the USPTO and contractors.
1. Atomic Energy Act
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA) was enacted by Congress to secure
the government's ownership of subject inventions by operation of law.203 A "sub-
ject invention" under the AEA is an invention that relates to the utilization of spe-
cial nuclear material or atomic energy in atomic weapons ("NMAE invention"),
and thus, is closely related to national security.204 The AEA includes a declaration
of the strong federal policy for using the invention to improve the general welfare
and avoid its use in an atomic weapon.20 5 Reflecting this policy, the AEA prevents
the USPTO from issuing a patent to a NMAE invention as long as it is used in an
atomic weapon.20 6 It makes it clear that the federal government's ownership of the
invention falls into the definition of an NMAE invention by operation of law. The
AEA defines the government's ownership of a subject invention using language
that is very different from that in the Bayh-Dole Act defining ownership. Under the
AEA, any NMAE invention is "vested in and .. . the property of the [Atomic Ener-
gy] Commission if the invention is made or conceived in the course of or under any
contract . . . or arrangement entered into with or for the benefit of the Commis-
,,207
sion.
In order to secure the federal government's ownership of an NMAE invention
by operation of law, the AEA provides a mechanism for discovering any NMAE
inventions included in a patent application filed by an inventor, regardless of
whether the inventions resulted from federal funds. 20 8 Like the Bayh-Dole Act with
respect to contractors, the AEA imposes an obligation on all applicants to file
statements explaining the full facts surrounding the making and conceiving of the
inventions when they file patent applications for NMAE inventions. 2 09 The AEA
requires the USPTO to forward copies of the application and the statement to the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as soon as the USPTO concludes that the in-
vention is in the condition of allowance. 21 0 The USPTO must then issue a patent
203 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2011 et seq. (2006)).
204 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2006).
205 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
2 06 Id. § 2181.
2 07 Id. § 2182.
208 id.
209 id.
210 id
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directly to the AEC, if the Commission so directs.21' The AEA also provides appli-
cants with the right to challenge the Commission's ownership of invention if appli-
cants believe that the invention was not made or conceived in the course of any
contract or arrangement with the AEC.212
The AEA imposes a duty on inventors to file either a report of an invention
with the AEC or a patent application with the USPTO if they have made an NMAE
invention.213 Ownership disputes are resolved through interference procedures at
the USPTO.214 The AEA reinforces the government's ownership by negating any
potential waiver and by giving authority to the AEC to request that the USPTO
transfer ownership of the patent in the NMAE invention to the AEC if an applicant
215is found to have submitted a statement containing materially false statements.
It should be noted that NMAE inventions are different from other inventions
because the federal government is able to prevent the USPTO from issuing a patent
even if the government does not have any rights in the ownership of the inven-
tions.216 Both the AEA and the Invention Secrecy Act give the government the au-
thority to dispose of an inventor's rights in any patent deriving from a particular in-
vention. 217 Under the Invention Secrecy Act, the USPTO screens patent
applications to find those associated with NMAE inventions and may issue an order
to keep the invention secret, regardless of government ownership, if disclosure of
such invention might be detrimental to national security regardless of government
ownership.218 If such an order is issued, the grant of the patent is withheld as long
as the disclosure is deemed to be detrimental to national security. 219 The only rem-
edy for an applicant's loss of patent rights is monetary compensation. 2 20 Further,
whenever a patent is issued on an NMAE invention, the AEA provides the AEC
with the right to use the invention, as well as the right to issue a compulsory license
for a third party to use the invention.2 2 1
2. National Aeronautics and Space Act
Inventions relating to aeronautical and space activities are another type of in-
vention closely related to national security. Congress felt it necessary to promote
211 id.
212 id
2 13 Id. § 2181.
2 14 Id. § 2182.
2 15 d
216 1 CHISUM, supra note 91, § 1.06[4].
217 Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. § 181 (2006).
218 d.
219 d
220 1d. § 183.
221 42 U.S.C. § 2183 (2006).
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such activities in order to improve general welfare and national security; thus, it en-
acted the National Aeronautics and Space Act (NAS Act).222 Under the NAS Act,
aeronautical and space activities include (1) research into and the solution of prob-
lems related to flight within and outside the earth's atmosphere; (2) the develop-
ment, construction, testing, and operation of aeronautical and space vehicles for re-
search purposes; and (3) such other activities as may be required for the exploration
of space.223 Due to a strong federal policy in favor of promoting national security,
the NAS Act, like the AEA, clearly transfers the ownership of federally funded in-
ventions to the government by operation of law via the following provision: "such
invention shall be the exclusive property of the United States ....
The NAS Act provides a mechanism, similar to the mechanism found in the
German EIA, for securing government ownership of subject inventions. The NAS
Act requires all applicants to file a statement surrounding the circumstances under
which the invention was made so that the National Aeronautics and Space Admin-
istration ("NASA") can determine whether the invention resulted from the perfor-
mance of any contract work with NASA. 225 The NAS Act also gives NASA the au-
thority to request that the USPTO issue a patent directly to NASA on behalf of the
federal government.226 Finally, the NAS Act also provides an applicant with the
ability to challenge NASA's decision regarding ownership through interference
procedures at the USPTO.227
It is likely that many aeronautical and space activity related inventions fall in-
to the category of those inventions that would, if disclosed, be detrimental to na-
tional security. Thus, through the Invention Secrecy Act, the government has a
right of disposition with respect to such inventions, so long as it provides fair com-
pensation to applicants.
3. Applicability of the Ownership Transfer Mechanism to the Bayh-Dole
Act
Unfortunately, the mechanisms included in the AEA and NAS Acts that se-
cure the government's ownership of federally funded inventions are an ill fit to the
Bayh-Dole Act. Both the AEA and the NAS Acts impose heavy burdens on the
USPTO to screen inventions and to inform the government if any invention falls
within the scope of the Acts so that the related federal agencies can determine if the
222 National Aeronautics and Space Act (NAS Act) of 1958, 85 Pub. L. No. 85-568 § 102, 72 Stat. 426
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
223 42 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
224 42 U.S.C. § 305(a) (2006).
225 42 U.S.C. § 305(c) (2006).
226 42 U.S.C. § 305(d) (2006).
227 Id.
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government has any right in the ownership of an invention.2 28 The Acts also re-
quire applicants to submit a statement regarding the circumstances under which the
invention was made.22 9 This screening process is feasible at the USPTO only be-
cause the categories of inventions to which the Acts apply are narrowly tailored and
the number of applications relating to inventions falling within the categories is rel-
atively small. Expanding the categories of inventions to cover all types of inven-
tions that contractors could create during research and development is impossible.
Imposing on contractor-applicants a duty to file a statement reporting inventive ac-
tivities unnecessarily increases administrative burden on both the USPTO and ap-
plicants. In short, the increased administrative burden makes it impractical for the
Bayh-Dole Act to adopt the ownership transfer mechanism from the AEA or NAS
Acts.
III. Ownership Transfer Mechanism Under the German EIA
As Congress has done in the past, it can reasonably look for an ownership
transfer mechanism in foreign employee invention systems, such as the German
EIA, which is already a model for many Asian and European countries. This is par-
ticularly true with the Bayh-Dole Act because texts in the Act suggest that the Act
assumed that the ownership rules for employee inventions in the failed bills, which
were based on the German EIA, would be enacted.2 3 0 Overall, the German EIA's
mechanism for securing rights in the ownership of invention is very similar to the
one in the Bayh-Dole Act, sharing the following five key features: (1) inventor's
duty to report;2 31 (2) employer's rights to claim the ownership of an invention re-
sulting from the performance of an employment or research contract; 232 (3) duty to
file domestic and foreign patent applications;233 (4) retention of the ownership of an
invention by its inventor if no one exercises a superior right to claim; 2 34 and (5)
right of reasonable compensation for transfers of rights in the ownership of inven-
tions.235 Moreover, the fundamental ownership rules under German Patent Law
are the same as the rules under U.S. Patent Law.236 Legislative histories of these
Acts reveal a cornerstone event in one country followed by a similar event in the
other, which suggests that U.S. and German governments were aware that they
228 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 § 152 (1954) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (2006)); National Aeronautics and Space Act (NAS Act) of 1958, 85 Pub.
L. No. 85-568 § 305(c), 72 Stat. 426 (1958).
229 id
230 See supra Part 1.2.
231 German ElA supra note 19, § 5.232 Id §6.
233 Id §§ 13-14.
234 Id § 8.
235 d
236 See infra Part III.2.A.
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were engaging in similar exercises. Reflecting the risk adverse German culture that
prefers written rules and detailed codes of conduct, the German EIA contains more
detailed procedures for transferring ownership and more specific mechanisms to
protect employee interests than the Bayh-Dole Act.237
1. Origin of Common Key Features: Possible Legislative Interaction
The German EIA provides a comprehensive mechanism for employers to se-
cure all property rights in the ownership of inventions made by employees. 238 Due
to Germany's unique practice of compromising between public interests based on
employment and patent law, the German legislature enacted a law independent
from German Patent Law that included both details for rights and obligations be-
tween employees and their employers and procedures to transfer rights in the own-
ership of inventions from employee-inventors to their employers.23 9
In Germany, the effort to clarify ownership and compensation started at the
beginning of the 2 0 'h Century as the number of employee-inventors increased.240
This was also the time when Congress began to examine the government's rights to
use inventions made by private persons, as well as those made by federal employ-
ees, eventually leading to the Bayh-Dole Act.24 1 During WWI, German employee-
inventors were able to develop a collective bargaining power that led to the first
collective labor agreement in the chemical industry in 1920, which dealt with own-
ership and compensation for employee inventions.242 Other industry sectors fol-
lowed this example.243 In 1942, during WWII and after several failed attempts to
replace the collective labor agreements with a generally applicable law, the Minis-
ter of Armament, motivated by the necessity of promoting technological advance-
ment, issued a regulation to handle employee inventions.244 The 1942 regulation
already included a number of the key features of the ownership transfer mechanism
that would later be contained in the modern German EIA.245 The regulation was
revised in 1943 to add guidelines for calculating the amount of remuneration based
on a list of factors.246
237 See infra Part Ill.2.B.
238 See infra Part III.2.B.
239 HARHOFF & HoISL, supra note 75, at 8.
24 0Id at7.
241 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 4.
242 HARHOFF & HOISL, supra note 75, at 7 n.6 (stating the name of the landmark agreement of April
27, 1920: Reichstarifvertragfuir die akademischgebildetenAngestellten der chemischenIndustrieas).
243 Id. at 7.
244 Id. (stating the name of the regulation: Verordnungilber die Behandlung von Erfindungen von
Gefolgschaftsmitgliedern ("Provisions on the Handling of Inventions of Subordinates")).
245 Id.
246 Id. (stating the name of the revised regulation: Richtslinien fir die Vergiltung von
Gefolgschftserfindungen ("Guidelines for Subordinate Inventions")).
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That same year, President Roosevelt requested that the United States Attorney
General develop a uniform patent policy for federal employees and contractors.24 7
A report was published by the Attorney General a few years later in response to the
President's request. 24 8 The report recommended a mechanism that decided the
ownership by classifying inventions developed by federal employees into three cat-
egories, which are somewhat similar to the categories of inventions under the Ger-
man EIA.249
As soon as it recovered from the aftermath of WWII, the German government
resumed its effort to enact a law that would allocate ownership rights in employee
inventions and provide for inventor compensation. 2 50 Although introduced in 1952,
the first bill failed to be enacted into law due to overly lengthy discussions. 25' The
current German Employee Inventions Act became effective in 1957, including all
five key features.252 The Act was revised in 1959 to incorporate official guidelines
for calculating the amount of inventor remuneration.2 53
It is also interesting to note that in 1963, only a few years after the enactment
of the German EIA, the U.S. government published the Kennedy Patent Policy,
which was most influential with respect to the Bayh-Dole Act as it recommended
254
all of the key features in that Act's current provisions. Although the Kennedy
Patent Policy was never implemented as a government-wide patent policy, many
federal agencies adopted their own policies incorporating a few or all of its key fea-
tures.2 55 The key features of the Kennedy Patent Policy survived modification by
the Nixon Administration 25 6 and were finally codified when the Bayh-Dole Act
was enacted in 1980.257
247 O'CONNOR, ET AL., supra note 63, at 6.
248 Id. at 6-7 (referring to the Dep't of Justice, Investigation of Government Patents and Practices and
Policies, Reports and Recommendations of the Attorney General to President of 1947).
249 id.
250 Germany was divided into West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany) and East Germany
(German Democratic Republic) over the period between 1949 and 1990. East Germany had its own
employee invention system during the period.
251 HARHOFF & HoiSL, supra note 75, at 7-9.
252 Id at8.
253 Id. at 9.
254 See Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies, 28 Fed. Reg. 10943, 10943-46
(Oct. 12, 1963) (listing the provisions proposed for U.S. patent policy).
255 O'CONNOR, ET AL, supra note 63, at 11.
256 Memorandum for the Heads of Exec. Dep't and Agencies on Gov't Patent Policy, 36 Fed. Reg.
16,887, Aug. 23, 1971.
257 O'CONNOR, ET AL, supra note 63, at 11.
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Likewise, all five key features in the German EIA have remained the same
since its enactment in 1957.258 The EIA was recently revised in 2002 and 2009, but
these revisions did not significantly affect the key features. 259
In parallel to the above exercise leading to the Bayh-Dole Act, the U.S Con-
gress also examined a series of bills starting the 1970S2 60 followed by the last bill in
1982.261 Many provisions of these bills are effectively translations of the German
EIA. These bills confirm Congress's strong interests in the German EIA, which
would have resulted in a clear influence on the overall structure of the Bayh-Dole
Act.
2. Ownership Rules Under the German EIA
A) Fundamental Rule: Inventors as Original Owners
Under German patent law, a right to patent is initially vested only in the sole
inventor or co-inventors who have made creative contributions to the invention.262
An employer cannot be an inventor or co-inventor unless he or she makes such a
contribution. Additionally, only a natural person can make such a contribution;
thus, a legal entity cannot be an inventor.263 This fundamental rule is universal to
all branches of intellectual property, including copyright, in the German legal sys-
tem. There is no "work for hire" exception to the rule as there is in U.S. copyright
law.
Because ownership in both German and U.S. patent law always originates
from the inventor, an examination of inventorship is a sensible starting point for de-
termining ownership. While patent law applies to determine who is the inventor,
unlike U.S. patent law, German patent law plays a very limited role in determining
the ownership of an invention before the patent application is filed.264 In general,
the property and contract principles found in the German Civil Codes govern the
265
assignment of property rights, including those in the ownership of an invention.
Regarding the ownership of property rights resulting from the performance of duty
under an employment contract, German labor and employment law may provide a
258 TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 2.
259 Id.; Anja Petersen-Padberg & Markus Georg Milller, Reform of the German Act on Employees'
Inventions as of I October 2009: Companies' Rights to Inventions Have Been Expanded,
NEWSLETTER (Hoffman Elite) Feb 17, 2010, at 2, available at
http://195.30.228.55/media/he-downloads/datei/0/141/HENewsletter05-2009.pdf.
260 H.R. 1483, 92d Cong. (1971).
261 Kastenmeier Bill, H.R. 6635, 97th Cong. (1982).
262 Patentgesetz [PatG] [Patent Act], Dec. 16, 1980, Bundesgesetzblatt [BHBI] at 501, § 6 (Ger.)
[hereinafter German Patent Act].
263 id.
264 Id; Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006).
265 KRA8ER, PATENTRECHT, § 40(111) (6th ed. 2009).
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special rule governing contracts between employers and their employees that re-
flects public policy regarding the ownership of property rights resulting from the
performance of duty under an employment contract.266 German labor and employ-
ment law makes it clear that the fruits of employees' labor belong to their employ-
ers. 26 7 This ownership rule conflicts with the patent law rule, which vests original
ownership in inventors. To remove this conflict while achieving the public policies
of both patent law and labor and employment law, German legislators enacted the
EIA, which governs the assignment of invention ownership rights between employ-
ers and employees.268
B) Employers' Rights in Employee Inventions Under the German
EIA
Under the German EIA, the patent law rule that inventors are original owners
prevails over the employer-friendly rule of employment law. 2 69 Thus, the German
EIA's rule is perfectly in-line with U.S. law in vesting original ownership rights in
employee-inventors.2 70 However, the German EIA differs from the U.S. rule by
guaranteeing employers a right to claim either the transfer of ownership of employ-
ees' inventions or an exclusive license to use those inventions.27 1 In other words,
the German EIA limits the parties' freedom of contract and makes any contract
conflicting with a provision of EIA void.272
Due to the mandatory nature of the German EIA, and the strong public poli-
cies it reflects, the German EIA clearly defines the scope of inventions that it gov-
erns. The Act covers any technical subject matter, regardless of its patentability, as
long as it is made by an employee-inventor.2 73 Under German employment law, an
employee is a person who is bound by instructions on the grounds of an employ-
ment relationship and obliged in personal dependence on another, the employer.274
The technical subject matter that the German EIA governs is classified into inven-
tions and technical improvement proposals.27 5 Inventions are distinguished from
technical improvement proposals in that inventions qualify for protection under ei-
266 Id. § 21(1)(a).
267 BAG [Federal Labour Court] 1961 NJW 1509; BORGERLICHES GESETZBACH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE],
Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDSGESETZBLATT, TEILI [BGBL.I] 42, §§ 611, 613 (Ger.) [hereinafter German Civil
Code].
268 TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 2.
269 See generally German EIA, supra note 19.
270 German Patent Act, supra note 262, § 6; TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 1.
271 German EIA, supra note 19, § 6.
2 7 2 Id. § 22.
273 Id. § 1; HARHOFF & HoISL, supra note 75, at 9.
274 TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 12.
275 German EIA, supra note 19, § § 2-3.
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ther German patent law or utility model registration.276 Subject matter that maybe
not the subject of a patent falls into the category of technical improvement pro-
posals and is not subject to various duties relating to patent applications.2 77
Patentable inventions are further classified into two types: service inventions
278(also known as "tied" inventions) and free inventions. An invention made during
a term of employment is a service invention if (1) it resulted from the employee's
tasks in the employer's business or public administration, or (2) it is essentially
based upon the experience or activities of the employer's business or public admin-
istration. 2 79 Any inventions that do not fall into the definition of service invention
are free inventions.2 80
The German EIA guarantees employers the right to claim ownership of all
property rights in service inventions.2 8 1 Before the 2009 revision, an employer had
to submit a document that met certain formality requirements under the Civil
Code.282 The revision eliminated the formality requirement and made it possible
for employers to make a declaration by an e-mail or facsimile.283 Accordingly,
ownership transfer under the German EIA was not automatic; thus, the German
EIA was different from the U.S. AEA and NAS Acts, in which assignment of in-
vention ownership rights was automatic as an operation of law. Like an assignment
based on the "agree to assign" term in Stanford, an assignment under the German
EIA is executed only when the inventor's employer exercises its right to claim
ownership. 284 This pre-2009 requirement of a written instrument to execute an as-
signment is also similar to the practice widely adopted by U.S. employers of using
64 285
agree to assign" terms in pre-invention assignment contracts.
Failing to exercise the claiming right may forfeit the employer's right in the
ownership of service inventions under the German EIA.286 The EIA lets employee-
inventors retain ownership rights and gives freedom to assign ownership to a third-
party, including the employer's competitor, if their employers do not exercise their
276 Id §2.
277 Id §3.
278 Id. § 4(1).
279 Id. § 4(2).
280 German EIA, supra note 19, § 4(3).
281 Id. § 6(1).
22 German Civil Code, supra note 267, § 126b.
283 Petersen-Padberg & MOller, supra note 259, at 3.
284 IpVenture, Inc. v. Prostar Computer, Inc., 503 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
285 See Arachnid, Inc. v. Merit Industries, Inc., 939 F.2d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (providing an
example of an "agree to assign" clause).
286 German EIA, supra note 19, § 8.
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claiming rights within the "four months from the receipt of proper report."287 The
2009 revision remedied this problem by introducing a presumption of employers'
proper exercise of their claiming right unless they send out a declaration negating
their claim and releasing their rights to the invention within four months of receiv-
ing an invention report from the employee. 288 This assumption made the EIA's
ownership transfer mechanism complete in terms of protecting employers from loss
of their rights in service inventions because of their negligence or ignorance of EIA
provisions.
The German EIA further protects employers' rights by voiding any transac-
tions that transferred ownership of a service invention prior to the employer's exer-
cise of its claim if those transactions affect the employer's right.2 8 9 As of the 2009
revision, any prior transactions become void when the four month period for declar-
ing the release of a service invention expires.290 After an employee submits a re-
port, the employer has two months to request supplemental information for the re-
port.2 9 1 Upon the expiration of this two month period, a report is deemed to be
complete and triggers the four month period for declaring the release of the inven-
tion. Without a timely declaration of release, all property rights in the ownership of
service inventions transfer to the employer.2 92
Although the Bayh-Dole Act adopted the same default rule and claiming right,
the Bayh-Dole Act lacked any mechanism to secure the transfer of ownership rights
between contractors and their employees. Even though the Act gives contractors a
claiming right with respect to their federal funding employer, it provides no express
right to claim ownership of inventions made by the contractors' employee-
inventors.293 Whether contractors can secure ownership of such inventions depends
on state contract law and special legislation that may limit the enforceability of pre-
invention assignments, despite contractors' duties under the current default rule to
transfer rights in such inventions to the federal funding agency if contractors do not
exercise their right to elect title.
Under the German ElA, the complete ownership transfer mechanism func-
tions only with respect to service inventions. To distinguish free inventions from
service inventions, the EIA imposes a duty on employees to prepare a report on all
inventions as soon as they complete them, unless such inventions are obviously un-
287 Id. § 6.
288 Id. § 6(2).
289 Id. § 7.
290 1d § 6(2).
291 German EIA supra note 19, § 5(3).
292 Id § 7.
293 See generally id.
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related to the employers' business.294 A report regarding a service invention must
include information sufficient to understand and describe the technical problem, its
solution, and how the invention was made. 295 To meet this duty, German inventors
are required to keep records, similar to those necessary to establish first-to-invent
priority under the U.S. patent system.296
If an employer decides that an invention is a free invention, the employee
does not need to prepare a detailed report showing inventive activities.297 However,
the report must always include sufficient information for the employers to confirm
that the nature of the invention is actually outside of the definition of a service in-
vention.298 Accordingly, the German EIA incorporates language clarifying the
scope of inventions that are governed by the mandatory ownership transfer mecha-
nism from employees to employers.
The Bayh-Dole Act also imposes a duty on contractors to disclose each sub-
ject invention to the federal funding agency within a reasonable time.299 However,
the scope of inventions under the duty of disclosure is not clear from the definition
of "subject invention."o00 The Stanford Court interpreted the scope of subject in-
vention to include "those owned by or belonging to the contractor." 30 1 It follows
that contractors fall out of the duty to disclose if they fail to secure ownership of
federally funded inventions due to the lack of written assignment or enforceability
of such assignment due to the state contract policy. 30 2 Moreover, the Bayh-Dole
Act does not impose any duty of disclosure on contractor employee-inventors , but
instead solely relies on contracts between inventors and contractors.303 Because
state law also controls here, it is unclear whether these contracts are enforceable
with respect to the same scope of inventions for all contractors' technical employ-
ees who might be involved in federally funded research activities.
Under the German EIA, the transfer of ownership rights through exercising a
claiming right also results in a variety of obligations on employers. First, the EIA
imposes a duty on employers to pay a reasonable remuneration by providing em-
29 4 Id. §§ 5(1), 18.
295 Id. § 5(2).
296 id.
297 See TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 22-24 (providing a general discussion of the duty to report).
298 German EIA supra note 19, § 18(1).
299 35 U.S.C. § 201(C)(1) (2006); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. _ 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 (2011).
300 35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2006).
301 Stanford, 563 U.S. ___ 131 S. Ct. at 2196.
302 See supra Part I.4.
303 See 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(f)(2) (containing a model patent contract included in Bayh-Dole
Implementation Regulations that includes a clause to require contractors to impose a duty on their
employees, except for clerical and nontechnical employees, to disclose their inventions).
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ployees a right to compensation from the transfer of invention ownership to the
employers. 30 However, an employee cannot enforce his right unless his employer
starts utilizing the patent.305 The EIA requires employers to take into account mul-
tiple factors for calculating compensation.30 6 Due to the complexity of considering
multiple factors, the EIA recommends consulting with established guidelines for
calculating the amount of remuneration.0o
Second, the EIA imposes a duty on employers to file a German patent or utili-
ty model application without delay.308 Employers are not released from this duty
unless their employee-inventors agree to forego the patent application or the em-
ployer protects the invention as a trade secret.309 However, employers can only
choose the latter option if they inform the employee-inventor of their decision to
use trade secret protection while acknowledging patentability of the disclosed in-
vention under German patent or utility model law.310 If an employer fails to file a
patent application within a reasonable time, the EIA authorizes employees to file
applications under the name of the employer at the expense of the employer.3 1
However, the Act does not give an option that allows employees to file applications
in their own names even if their employers fail to file an application.312
Third, the EIA provides a right for employers to file foreign applications
based on ownership of inventions acquired through claiming rights in employee in-
ventions.1 However, that right functions to impose a duty on employers to file
foreign applications. Otherwise, the employees can request a release to file foreign
applications on their own, if the employers are not interested. 3 14 Employers must
inform their employees of their intent to release foreign applications early enough
to allow employees to file an application within the priority period under the Paris
Convention.31s Although it is very unlikely that employees are interested in secur-
ing patents in foreign countries where their employers are not interested in exploit-
ing the invention, if an employee-inventor does file and secure a patent in a foreign
country, the resulting rights and licenses may be assigned and granted to any per-
3 German EIA, supra note 19, § 9(1).
305 REITZLE, ET AL., supra note 19, § 9.
306 German EIA supra note 19, § 9(2).
307 Id. § 11.
30 8 Id § 13.
3 Id. § 13(2).
310 Id. § 17(1).
31 German EIA, supra note 19, § 13(3).
3 12 See id. (providing employee rights but not the right to file in one's own name).
313Id § 14(1).
314 Id. § 14(2).
3 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 4, Mar. 20, 1883, 24 U.S.T. 2140.
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son, including the employer's competitors. For equity purposes, the EIA provides a
compulsory license for the employer if its employee obtains a foreign patent on the
employee's invention.3 16
Fourth, the EIA imposes a duty on employers to communicate with employ-
ee-inventors regarding patent prosecution.317 This communication is particularly
critical if the employer decides to abandon a patent application or patent right,
which subsequently gives rise to employees' right to continue the patent application
or maintain the patent right. To avoid this cumbersome duty, employers in major
German companies often offer a lump-sum payment to their employees to compen-
sate for waiving this communication right.3 19
The Bayh-Dole Act imposes similar obligations on contractors when they
elect to retain rights in the ownership of federally funded inventions. 32 0 However,
the Bayh-Dole Act does not include a mechanism to effectively enforce these obli-
gations. For example, the Act requires non-profit organizations to compensate em-
ployee-inventors through royalty sharing.321 The Act provides neither methods of
calculation nor sanctions for violations. Because the Act gives broad discretion to
contractors-employers, it is very difficult for inventors to dispute their share of roy-
alties.
The Bayh-Dole Act also requires contractors to file domestic and foreign pa-
tent applications prior to any statutory bar date.322 The Act provides a sanction for
failing to meet this requirement, but that sanction is simply to return ownership of
the invention to the federal agency so that that agency can file a patent applica-
tion.323 Bayh-Dole regulations require elections to retain rights to be made 60 days
prior to the date of the statutory bar; however, the Act does not require that there be
notice to the agency with respect to a patent application.32 4 Without any notice, it is
very unlikely that the federal agency would discover the contractor's failure to file
a patent application early enough to prepare a patent application on its own and file
it prior to a statutory bar date. Even if the federal agency discovers the violation, it
316 German EIA, supra note 19, § 14(3).
317 Id. § 15.
318 Id. § 16.
319 See TRIMBORN, supra note 19, at 31 (explaining that in general German companies pay 50 to 300
euros for buying out the rights of foreign patent applications and the rights of patent prosecution
communication).
320 35 U.S.C.§ 202(c) (2006).
321 Id. § 202(c)(7).
322 Id. § 202(c)(3).
323 id.
324 Standard Patent Rights Clauses, 37 C.F.R. § 401.14 (c)(2).
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is unlikely that the agency would file a patent application because federal agencies
are very reluctant to interfere with contractors' technology transfer activities.325
Finally, the Bayh-Dole Act does not create any duty on the part of either the
federal government or contractors to communicate with inventors about a patent fil-
ing or prosecution of their inventions. There is no mechanism for inventors to ex-
ercise their rights and request to retain ownership of inventions if their employers
choose not to file for patent protection.326 If a patent application is not filed, inven-
tors are deprived of their rights for compensation from the transfer of invention
ownership, even if contractors elect to retain title of their inventions.
In contrast, the German EIA incorporates a mechanism to protect employees'
compensation rights by allowing them to file domestic and foreign patent applica-
tions in a timely fashion if their employers fail to file a patent application.327 Since
these rights of compensation are supported by employers' ownership of exclusive
rights to practice the invention, employees do not have any compensation right un-
less a patent application is filed. The EIA further protects employees' compensa-
tion rights by giving them opportunities to continue prosecution and maintain pa-
tents if their employers decide to abandon a patent application or patent right.
Employees lose their rights to compensation if a patent application does not result
in a patent grant or a granted patent is invalidated. The EIA is based on the clear
principle that in the absence of compensation, ownership should be returned to em-
ployees, because there is no longer justification for employers to retain ownership.
The Bayh-Dole Act includes none of these mechanisms that guarantee inven-
tors' rights to compensation. Since contractors' technology transfer offices for
many non-profit organizations are understaffed, many inventors are frustrated with
delays in filing patent applications and loss of patent rights. Moreover, Stanford
forces these contractors to adopt the practice of using contract terms to trigger as-
signments as soon as inventions are completed. Such practice should substantially
increase the number of inventions that contractors secure through pre-invention as-
329
signments. It is impossible for contractors to file applications for all inventions.
Federal agencies obtain ownership in many of these inventions because contractors
either refrain from electing to retain title or violate the duty of timely filing.33 0 It is
325 Richard Li-Dar Wang, Biomedical Upstream Patenting and Scientific Research: The Case for
Compulsory Licenses Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 251, 309 (2008).
326 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006).
327 German EIA supra note 19, § 14(1)(2).
328Id. § 16.
329 Hogan Lovells, Stanford v. Roche: Highlighting the Importance of Best Practices for Employee
Assignments, Intellectual Property Report (Apr. 21, 2011), available at
http://ehoganlovells.com/ve/a9181uV9198Ztc/vT=1.
330 Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2)(3) (2006).
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very unlikely that the agencies would file patent applications for such inventions
prior to the statutory bar dates.
IV. Finding the Missing Piece of the Puzzle: Making the Bayh-Dole Act
Complete
1. Adoption of Ownership Transfer Mechanism Under the German EIA
Unlike the ownership transfer mechanisms under the AEA and NAS Acts, the
ownership transfer mechanism under the German EIA does not increase the admin-
istrative burden of the USPTO or applicants. The mechanism fits well within the
Bayh-Dole Act because it was examined by Congress for adoption in the 1970s and
1980s and the German EIA and Bayh-Dole share common features for allocating
ownership.3 3' It is unlikely that U.S. industries and the legal community would op-
pose introducing the EIA ownership transfer mechanism because the introduction
of the mechanism was not a factor that caused the past bills to be rejected by Con-
gress; the bills failed because of opposition to imposing a duty on employers to pay
a mandatory compensation.332 Industry representatives criticized the mandatory
compensation as being unfair to employers and impossible to administer.333
Adopting an ownership transfer mechanism in the Bayh-Dole Act should be
relatively simple and easy. The current Bayh-Dole provision for contractors' rights
to retain title of federally funded inventions334 is textually very similar to the Ger-
man EIA provision protecting employers' claiming rights.3 35 Thus, the Bayh-Dole
Act can be revised to clarify that an employee-inventor's ownership rights to any
subject invention automatically transfers to the employer-contractor when the con-
tractor elects to retain title in the invention under the current provision.33 6 At this
time, the Act only requires contractors to send written election notice to the federal
funding agency.337 This written notice executes a contractor's right to retain title to
a subject invention when received by the federal agency unless one of the excep-
338
tions allows the agency to receive title of the invention. The current provision
can be revised to require contractors sending notice to employee-inventors to exe-
331 See supra Part 1.2.
332 Dratler, supra note 68, at 184 n.204.
333 id.
334 35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006) ("Each nonprofit organization or small business firm may, within a
reasonable time after disclosure as required by paragraph (c)(1) of this section, elect to retain title to
any subject invention .... .").
3 German EIA, supra note 19, §6 ([1] The employer can claim the right to a service invention on an
unrestricted or restricted basis. [2] The claiming of right occurs by written declaration to the
employee. The declaration shall be submitted as soon as possible, and no later than four months from
the receipt of the proper report.).
336 35 U.S.C. § 202(a).
3 Id. § 202(c)(2).
... Id. § 201(a).
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cute transfers of the ownership of subject inventions upon the receipt of notice by
the employee-inventor.
To clarify the effect of an employer's election to retain ownership of an in-
vention, Congress may recycle a provision from the employee invention bills, mod-
eled after the German EIA, and prevent inventors from assigning their inventions to
third-parties.3 39 Such a provision would make it clear that a contractor's right to
elect to retain title of federally funded inventions cannot be terminated unilaterally
by an inventor through separate agreements to assign the ownership of his inven-
tion to third-parties during the statutory two year period in which contractors are
required to elect title of the inventions.3 40 This would give priority to contractors'
election rights over any other rights arising from private contracts and prevent in-
ventors from assigning their inventions to third-parties. Once the statutory time pe-
riod expires without a contractor's exercise of its election right, inventors should
retain ownership of the invention and be free to assign such ownership to third-
parties for commercialization. The current Bayh-Dole Act provides inventors a
right to request retention of invention ownership from federal agencies34' and such
requests must be granted unless the agency itself files a patent application within a
reasonable time and prosecutes the application for commercialization.
For the mechanism to function effectively, the Bayh-Dole Act should be re-
vised to clarify the scope of subject inventions in which the ownership is trans-
ferred by contractor's election. The Stanford majority's decision that "subject in-
ventions" excludes inventions that contractors failed to secure because of contract
drafting traps or limitations on state legislation undermines the Act's basic objec-
tive for implementing a uniform federal policy and conflicts with Congress' intent
to incorporate a mandatory compensation provision into the Bayh-Dole Act for
non-profit organizations.342 It is likely that Congress included the mandatory com-
pensation provision-despite strong criticism, a major reason for the failed bills-
because it viewed the provision as necessary to justify taking invention ownership
through contractors from inventors. The definition of subject inventions must be
revised to include all inventions made by contractors' employees so that contractors
can secure ownership of such inventions through the ownership transfer mechanism.
339 H.R. 5605 § 412(b)(c) (1975) ("Any disposition of a service invention by the employee prior to the
time of the declaration of a claim by the employer which impair the employer's rights under this
section is invalid to the extent that it impairs such rights."); German EIA, supra note 19, § 7.
340 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(2); Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
563 U.S _, 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2200-01 (2011). (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the current
Bayh-Dole Act also guarantees the priority of contractors' election right over any rights arising from
private contracts).
341 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006).
342 Id. § 202(c)(7).
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Moreover, Congress could use the mandatory compensation provision to en-
dorse contractors securing ownership of inventions made by inventors outside the
employment relationship. Congress may have assumed a pre-invention assignment
between contractors and their employees, including faculty members and students
who do not fall into the category of hired-to-invent, and provided the mandatory
compensation to justify employers taking ownership of those inventions, regardless
of the common law. However, it may not have anticipated today's research envi-
ronment where researchers inter-flow beyond the rational notion of a single legal
entity and interact with students throughout the invention process. 3 43  Obviously,
the Stanford Court rejected such a broad scope of invention to be governed by the
Bayh-Dole Act when it excluded from "subject invention" an invention which was
conceived and reduced to practice when the inventor was not an employee of a con-
tractor or when the inventor received an insignificant amount of federal funding
toward the invention.34 However, such a restrictive interpretation of subject in-
ventions will exclude many inventions which the federal government funded and
which should be under the Bayh-Dole conditions and restrictions to promote special
public interests for commercialization. To reflect the research environment result-
ing from academic-industry collaboration, Congress should consider applying the
Bayh-Dole Act to any inventions resulting from the performance of work under a
funding agreement or the Bayh-Dole Act by revising the definition of subject in-
vention to include any invention made by any inventor, regardless of employment
status, as long as the invention resulted from the performance of work under a fund-
ing agreement.
To ensure that such inventions are subjected to the ownership transfer mecha-
nism, the revised Bayh-Dole Act must require any inventors involved in federally
funded research to disclose their inventions. It is not sufficient to impose such
duties through contracts between contractors and inventors because inventors may
not be employees. Further, state contract laws may prevent enforcement of the dis-
closure duty for non-employees.
The Stanford Court indicated a concern over the lack of procedures for pro-
tecting rights of inventors and third-parties that have been involved in federally
funded research but did not receive funds from a federal agency.346 To address a
343 Reder, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that in academic-industry collaborations, employee status of
researchers is often unclear because many of them work as consultants, temporary staffs, interns and
contract workers).
4 Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2198.
345 It can use provisions from the past bills with respect to the content and procedures for disclosing
subject inventions. H.R. 5605 § 411(a) (1975) ("An employee who has made a service invention must
give written notice of the service invention to his employer without undue delay...."). However, the
definition of employee must be expanded to reflect the modem research environment at universities.
346 Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. __ 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2198 (2011).
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similar concerns over disputes between inventors and their employers with respect
to the scope of inventions that employers can claim through transfer of the owner-
ship, the past employee invention bills incorporated judicial review and arbitration
at the USPTO.3 47 The Bayh-Dole Act may be revised to include these procedures
to protect the interests of inventors and third-parties. For employers of visiting re-
searchers who used federal funding and received ownership of invention, the com-
mon law rules guarantee a shop right, which will give employers bargaining power
to negotiate with the researchers for an exclusive license.
2. Adoption of Compensation Right Protection Mechanism Under the
German EIA
The Bayh-Dole Act should also be revised to adopt a mechanism similar to
the one found in the German EIA that would protect employee-inventor's rights for
compensation by allowing employee-inventors to file patent applications if their
employer-contractors fail to file. Guaranteeing compensation to employee-
inventors is essential for securing the ownership of all federally funded inventions.
Since the term "subject invention" should be redefined to include all inventions
made by any researchers who engage in the research with federal funding, the
scope of subject inventions under the new definition would be much broader than
the scope of inventions suggested by the Stanford Court 3 4 8 or covered by the com-
mon law and state contract laws, both of which allow automatic transfer of inven-
tion ownership upon the completion of invention, regardless of express assignment
agreements. 34 9 The Bayh-Dole Act's strong federal policy of promoting important
public interests justifies such takings regardless of inventors' employment status, 350
while the Fifth Amendment requires the federal government to compensate inven-
tors.3 ' Accordingly, the Act provides inventors a right of compensation when the
ownership of invention is transferred to their employer-contractors.
However, the current Bayh-Dole Act is incomplete because it lacks a mecha-
nism to protect inventors' right to compensation. The Act only allows inventors to
exercise their rights to compensation if contractors license their employee-
inventor's inventions and receive royalty revenues.352 If contractors elect to retain
title in an invention but fail to file a patent application, employees' rights to com-
pensation are effectively eliminated. Without compensation, neither the federal
agency nor the employer-contractor have justification for receiving ownership of
347 H.R. 5605 §§ 435-36 (1975).
" Stanford, 563 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. at 2198-99.
349 See supra Part 1.3-4.
350 See Stanford, 563 U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. at 2201 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasizing important
public interests the Bayh-Dole Act aims to promote).
3 U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
352 35 U.S.C. § 201(c)(7)(B) (2006).
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inventions from inventors who did not have a chance to bargain for the ownership
of their inventions and failed to receive salaries reflecting compensation for such.
Thus, the Bayh-Dole Act should be revised to impose a duty on contractors to
send notice to the relevant federal agencies, as well as the employee-inventors
when patent applications are filed with the USPTO. As provided in the German
EIA, " if an employee does not receive notice that the employer is pursuing a pa-
tent application within a reasonable time after the employer has elected to retain ti-
tle of the invention, the employee should be able to file a patent application on be-
half of the contractor. A similar mechanism should be also incorporated with
respect to foreign patent applications.
Contractors may have concerns over the costs of reimbursing inventors for fil-
ing. However, such costs would be marginal and basically involve the cost of a
provisional application if the patent application is abandoned before any additional
costs are incurred. To allow employee-inventors to continue the patent prosecution,
the Bayh-Dole Act should be revised to give ownership of inventions back to in-
ventors if neither the federal agency nor the contractor is interested in prosecuting
patents, as provided in the German EIA.354 Ownership should be returned to the
employee-inventor if the contractor wants to abandon the patent. Once the patent
prosecution or patent is abandoned, the government and contractors lose justifica-
tion for retaining ownership because employee-inventor's rights of compensation
are eliminated. Thus, if inventors are interested in pursuing patent prosecution and
commercializing their own inventions, the ownership of invention should be re-
turned to the employee-inventor. However, the government should retain rights to
use the invention and "March-in Rights" once the employee obtains patents as pro-
vided in the current provision.355 If inventors are willing to invest their time and
money to successfully commercialize the invention, this mechanism will contribute
to the goals of the Bayh-Dole Act instead of wasting all of the efforts and invest-
ments already made by the government and contractors.
Conclusion
While the Stanford Court's interpretation of the Bayh-Dole Act is technically
correct, it is-as the dissent points out-inconsistent with the Act's basic purpose.
Stanford highlights a serious flaw in the current Act. Under the current system,
Stanford could not have avoided the result even if the inventor had executed an as-
signment contract with the private firm prior to its own assignment contract. U.S.
courts should have given priority to the private firm. As illustrated in Stanford, it is
difficult for a university to argue that it was a bona fide purchaser if the private firm
is a research partner and the university is aware of the collaboration. The Act
3 German EIA, supra note 19, § 13.
354 Id. § 16.
3 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) (2006).
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should adopt a mechanism from the German EIA that allows contractors to secure
ownership of federally funded inventions.
Such mechanisms will avoid a result that Congress did not intend: many fed-
erally funded inventions falling outside the scope of the Bayh-Dole Act due to con-
tractors' failures to secure ownership of such inventions. Instead, contractor-
employers would be able to secure ownership of federally funded inventions auto-
matically from inventors when they elect to retain title. The mechanism effectively
prevents inventors from lawfully assigning the ownership of federally funded in-
ventions to third-parties. The Bayh-Dole Act should also be revised to protect in-
ventors' rights to compensation so that the government can take the ownership of
federally funded inventions from its contractors with just compensation.
Moreover, the Act should be revised to expand the scope of "subject inven-
tion" to include any invention resulting from federally funded research, regardless
of the inventor's employment status with the contractors. In today's academic-
industry collaborative research environment, researchers move from one institution
to another with informal employment statuses. Unless the government can reach
out to those inventions made by inventors without any formal employment contract,
it cannot implement a uniform policy for federally funded inventions. Strong pub-
lic interests involved in the Bayh-Dole Act should justify the government reaching
out to all inventors involved in federally funded research while guaranteeing com-
pensation with the inventors through royalty sharing.
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